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GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP AS THE COMPLETION
OF COSMOPOLITANISM
LUIS CABRERA
Abstract: A conception of global citizenship should not be viewed as separate
from, or synonymous with, the cosmopolitan moral orientation, but as a primary
component of it. Global citizenship is fundamentally concerned with individual
moral requirements in the global frame. Such requirements, framed here as
belonging to the category of individual cosmopolitanism, offer guidelines on
right action in the context of global human community. They are complementary
to the principles of moral cosmopolitanism – those to be used in assessing
the justice of global institutions and practices – that have been emphasised
by cosmopolitan political theorists. Considering principles of individual and
moral cosmopolitanism together can help to provide greater clarity concerning
individual duties in the absence of fully global institutions, as well as clarity
on individual obligations of justice in relation to emerging and still-developing
trans-state institutions.
Keywords: Cosmopolitan, global citizenship, global justice, positive duties,
world government
The No More Deaths volunteer, a recent college graduate who was spending her
summer conducting humanitarian patrols in search of border crossers stranded in
the harsh desert of southern Arizona, struggled for words. The question grated.
‘I think that’s ridiculous’, she finally said, in response to those who would
contend it is wrong to aid unauthorised crossers. ‘One of the first questions a
reporter ever asked me was “why, as an American, are you doing this?” That’s
always funny to me, when people ask that. It’s not really an American thing.
It’s a people thing. You know, thirsty people should be given water. It seems to
me just to make sense’ (Author interview, 06/05). Her co-volunteer at the No
More Deaths patrol camp expressed a similar mix of difficulty and exasperation
when asked why she felt compelled to seek out migrants in distress. ‘There’s this
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imaginary line drawn across the desert. That doesn’t make any sense to me. For
someone to become illegal as soon as they cross that line – they are just people.
It’s that simple to me’ (Author interview, 06/05).
Meanwhile, participants in the Minuteman effort, who stand armed vigil on
some of the same stretches of desert, hoping to spot unauthorised entrants and
report them to US authorities, expressed quite a different sentiment toward the
crossers. ‘The country belongs to us. The country doesn’t belong to them’,
said one retiree who had traveled from Eunice, New Mexico, to take part in
the inaugural Minuteman action on the border in southeastern Arizona (Author
interview, 04/05). ‘I didn’t force them to come to the United States’, said David
Jones, a Minuteman leader in Arizona who had served as ‘line boss’ on several
vigils. Addressing a group at Minuteman field headquarters on a rural ranch, he
indicated a jug of murky brown water, likely filled in a cattle tank, that had been
taken from two crossers his group had helped apprehend. ‘If they want to come
and drink that, that’s their problem’, he said, while adding that he would not
refuse water to a crosser (Author interview, 10/06).
In this article, I discuss how the understanding of obligation and human
community expressed by the No More Deaths patrollers captures the core
of a defensible conception of global citizenship. More centrally, I explore
ways in which such a conception is necessary to developing a comprehensive
cosmopolitanism. That is, global citizenship, appropriately understood, should
be viewed not as separate from or synonymous with the cosmopolitan
moral orientation, but as a primary component of it. Global citizenship is
fundamentally concerned with individual moral requirements in the global
frame. Such requirements, framed here as belonging to the category of
individual cosmopolitanism, offer guidelines on right action in the context
of global human community. They are complementary to the principles of
moral cosmopolitanism, or those to be used in assessing the justice of global
institutions and practices, that have received the great majority of attention
from cosmopolitan political theorists. Considering principles of individual and
moral cosmopolitanism together can help to provide greater clarity concerning
individual duties in the absence of fully global institutions, and individual
obligations of justice in relation to still-developing institutions in interstate trade,
the global environment, human rights, and other substantive areas. Ultimately,
the fuller incorporation of global citizenship into the cosmopolitan moral
discourse is an important step toward developing an overarching conception
of cosmopolitan right, one that would detail appropriate courses of action and
reform in relation to individuals and institutions in the current global system.
The Cosmopolitan Moral Orientation
The concept of global citizenship often has been presented as strongly
synonymous with, or equivalent to, a cosmopolitan moral outlook (Heater
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2002; see Carter 1997). While the global citizen and cosmopolitan orientations
share many commonalities, significant insight can be gained by recognising the
two as distinct, and by considering the discrete variants of both approaches.
This section is concerned with identifying the main currents within recent
cosmopolitan thought. I will note first that cosmopolitan moral orientation is
generally understood as one in which individuals, rather than societies or states,
are presumed to be the ultimate units of moral concern. All individuals are
presumed to have equal status as the objects of moral concern, and all individuals
‘are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots,
fellow religionists, or suchlike’ (Pogge 2002: 169; see Caney 2005a: 3–4).
Thus, when applied to substantive issues such as distributive justice, a
conception of cosmopolitanism would hold that obligations to distribute
resources to compatriots are not categorically stronger than obligations to those
who do not share our citizenship. In fact, for those living in affluent states,
duties to redistribute to those in less-affluent states easily could trump duties
to compatriots, given the greater exposure of the former to hunger and other
poverty-related ills (see Beitz 1999a; Brock 2005). Other substantive concerns
include the justice in operation of such global institutions as the World Trade
Organisation (Moellendorf 2005), as well as the defensibility, in a cosmopolitan
moral frame, of particular kinds of interstate or inter-group conflict (Buchanan
2004; Caney 2005a: 201–14). In the context of political justice, theorists of
cosmopolitan democracy have argued that respect for individual autonomy in an
age of eroding state sovereignty requires the creation of suprastate participatory
mechanisms better able to afford meaningful input to individuals within states
(Archibugi 2004; Held 2004).
Important theoretical distinctions are drawn within the cosmopolitan
approach, in particular between institutional and moral cosmopolitanism,
and within moral cosmopolitanism itself. Institutional cosmopolitanism is
understood by most commentators as concerned with the creation of some
comprehensive network of global governing institutions, i.e. a world state,
in order to just global distributive and other outcomes (Beitz 1999b: 129;
see Barry 1998: 144; Waldron 2000: 228–9). Most reject any suggestion
that a cosmopolitan orientation necessarily entails a specific commitment to
institutional cosmopolitanism, though some, including this author, have argued
that in practice something like a global government likely would be required
to ensure that all individuals had sufficient access to life resources and
opportunities (Cabrera 2004; see Tannsjo 2008; c.f. Caney 2005a: 159–60).
Moral cosmopolitanism has been characterised as primarily concerned not
with institution building, but with assessing the justice of institutions in the
existing global system according to how individuals fare in relation to them.
Further, both Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, probably the two most influential
recent cosmopolitan theorists, have argued that moral cosmopolitanism should
be understood as including two categories of principles (Beitz 1999c: 519;
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Pogge 2002: 170).1 The first, which Beitz calls cosmopolitan liberalism,
essentially is identical to what had been called moral cosmopolitanism. It
remains an approach to assessing institutions or broad schemes of cooperation
by ‘identifying principles that are acceptable when each person’s prospects,
rather than the prospects of each society or people, are taken fairly into account’
(Beitz 1999c: 519). The second variant Beitz calls individual cosmopolitanism.
It is described as a guide for individual conduct consistent with cosmopolitan
principles. However, Beitz defers any further discussion on individual
cosmopolitanism, and he has not since returned to the topic. Pogge, while
noting that individual ethical principles may complement principles of justice
applicable to global institutions (2002: 170–72), has focused almost exclusively
on the institutional side. My claim again is that individual cosmopolitanism
can be understood as global citizenship, appropriately configured, and that it
is necessary to incorporate a defensible conception of global citizenship into
cosmopolitanism in order to present a complete view of cosmopolitan right.
Cosmopolitan Right
The concept of cosmopolitan right is most directly traceable to Kant’s political
writings (see Reiss 1970). As outlined in ‘Theory and Practice’, the basic
concept of right entails ‘the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that
it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else. . . . And public right is the
distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant harmony
possible’ (Kant 1970: 73). By extension, cosmopolitan right would address
comprehensively the principles that should rightly govern global human
interactions, primarily intersocietal ones but also some at the individual level.
For Kant, appropriate principles are derived in an approach in which
all individuals imagine themselves as co-legislators in a global ethical
commonwealth or ‘kingdom of ends’, concerned to respect the autonomy of
all others (Kant 2001; Linklater 1999a: 41). He also adopts the normative
claim that the earth is a common human holding, and he emphasises empirical
tendencies for groups to come into contact and often conflict with each other
(Waldron 2000: 230). The resulting principles of cosmopolitan right are most
fully elaborated in Perpetual Peace (Kant 2003; see Hayden 2005: 21). There,
the first definitive article addresses the republican principles that Kant believes
should prevail in domestic societies. The second definitive article mandates the
familiar global federation of republics, and the third article outlines a duty of
universal hospitality that should be extended to all individuals, one based in the
principle of common ownership of the earth.
Kant’s third definitive article is titled ‘The Law of World Citizenship Shall
Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality’, and indeed, his ius
cosmopoliticum, in its emphasis on not treating strangers as enemies, has been
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seen by some as quite limited. That is in part for its failure to attempt a global
regulation of individuals who are members of the same political community
(Benhabib 2001: 43), for a lack of consideration to distributive relations between
societies, and for a lack of attention to bringing individuals into some global
program of actual co-legislation, as per current proposals for cosmopolitan forms
of democratic rule (Linklater (1998: Ch. 6). Even so, Kant’s conception of world
citizenship, or a common human community, has served as a significant model or
starting place for many current conceptions (see Habermas 2006, 123–6), and his
multi-level framework offers invaluable guidance toward a more encompassing
concept of cosmopolitan right.
A more systematic or detailed framework, and one that has influenced the
divisions within current cosmopolitanism, is offered by John Rawls. Like
Kant, Rawls explores within a concept of right moral principles that could be
appropriately applied at the individual, societal, and intersocietal levels (Rawls
1999a: 93–101; see Kokaz 2007: 326). Each set of principles is chosen within a
discrete original position, the familiar Rawlsian device for deriving appropriate
moral guidelines by depriving each participant of the knowledge of her or his
own social standing, particular talents, and related information. Rawls gives
predominant attention, of course, to the principles he believes would be chosen
to apply to domestic institutions, and he is explicit that those should be the first
principles chosen. Principles of individual duty are to be chosen in a second
original position, along with principles of individual obligation in relation to
institutions. The individual principles are expected to be significantly influenced
or limited by the principles of justice for institutions chosen in the first original
position. Finally, principles to govern intersocietal relations, or in Rawls’s
specific term the law of peoples, are chosen in the third original position (Rawls
1999a: 331–5; Rawls 1999b).
Schematically, each set of principles is seen as necessary to complete a
concept of right, which itself is a component, alongside concepts of value and
moral worth, of an overarching concept of practical reason to guide moral action
in various contexts (Rawls 1999a: 94). I will note that, as was the case with Kant,
the framework or schematic structure of Rawls’s concept of right is more salient
here than the specific conceptions of justice, individual duty and obligation,
and intersocietal relations that Rawls believes would emerge from the choosing
situations at each of the levels. Rawls’s favored principles to govern intersocietal
relations, for example, would not require the kinds of high-level, trans-state
distributions that many cosmopolitans have argued are obligatory (Moellendorf
2002: Ch. 2; Hayden 2002). However, giving some attention to the individual
ethical principles that ostensibly would be chosen will help to make clearer some
ways in which conceptions of global citizenship would fit within a conception
of right that is specifically cosmopolitan in its orientation.
In Rawls’s schema, both natural duties and obligations are incumbent on all
individuals. Obligations arise within, and are to be defined according to, the
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rules or practices of specific institutions. Natural duties accrue to all persons
regardless of their membership in specific institutions or schemes of social
cooperation, include negative duties to avoid injuring others and positive duties
of mutual respect, mutual aid, and upholding justice. Mutual aid, characterised
as ‘helping another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do
so without excessive risk or loss to oneself’ (Rawls 1999a: 98) is particularly
significant here, as is the duty to uphold justice, which includes a requirement
that all persons comply with existing just institutions of which they are a part, as
well as to ‘further just arrangements not yet established’ (Rawls 1999a: 98–9).
A duty to comply with existing institutions may face special difficulties in
relation to gaps in justice between the principles of justice Rawls believes would
be chosen in the first original position – equal basic liberties and the difference
principle – and the justice of any actual scheme of institutions (Lyons 1998),
as well as more direct theoretical challenges concerned with political obligation
per se (Simmons 1979: 145–6; see Pogge 2002: 134–9). It will be appropriate
to limit the focus here to duties of mutual aid and a duty to further or possibly
create just arrangements, given their strong significance to questions arising in
a global frame, where no cohesive, comprehensive institutional structure exists.
It is here where conceptions of global citizenship become salient, in terms of
offering the most discrete and detailed forms of guidance for individual ethical
action in the absence of a fully elaborated institutional framework.
Global Citizenship
Global citizenship, as a theory of citizenship, is fundamentally concerned with
appropriate individual action (Dower 2005: 105; see O’Byrne 2003). In fact,
inherent in the concept of citizenship per se are probably the most concrete
and comprehensive expressions of individual moral requirement. This ‘legal
dimension’ of citizenship (Dagger 1997: 99; Janoski 1998: 8–11) is formalised
domestically in constitutions or sets of constitution-like documents, as well as
in the subsequent court rulings interpreting those documents and giving more
detailed substantive content to packages of rights. In the same vein, a fully elab-
orated conception of global citizenship holds the promise of delineating both the
rights that individuals should be presumed to possess in the global human com-
munity, and the duties and institutionally linked obligations that can be viewed as
incumbent on individuals in order to better secure the fulfillment of those rights.
In this section, I consider three broad ways of thinking about how citizenship
above the state might be conceived, formulated, or put into practice. Throughout,
I strive for sympathetic immanent critique, addressing the arguments on their
own terms as conceptions of global citizenship, and developing in context an
approach to global citizenship that could both encompass core aspects of many
of the specific conceptions discussed, and serve as a conception of individual




This approach essentially takes the sovereign states system as it is structured
and exhorts states, or state leaders, to pursue ethical foreign policies, including
respecting individual rights, assuming strong foreign aid obligations, acting
responsibly on environmental issues (see Linklater 1992; Carter 2001: 173–4;
Williams 2002). The approach is longstanding, with some significant resonance
of Kant’s prescriptions for states in Perpetual Peace. Aspects of it are present
in the Liberal idealism of Woodrow Wilson and others in the early twentieth
century, and in current human rights doctrine (see Beitz 1999b: 127).
The statist emphasis of international citizenship might be viewed as putting
the approach in immediate tension with the inherent universalism of a fully
global conception of citizenship. It will be useful to consider a nuanced recent
account, however, to clarify some sources and expressions of such tensions,
and to move toward a conception of international citizenship that could be
compatible with cosmopolitanism. Bryan Turner, one of the most prominent
current citizenship theorists, has offered an argument for international citizen-
ship that could be demanding in its individual moral prescriptions, and which,
while not rigidly statist, remains rooted in a states system (Turner 2002). For
Turner, patriotism, or love of one’s country, is compatible with a global citizen
orientation, which would consist in large part of the promotion of universal
human rights and obligations to secure them. One first learns to love one’s own
country, ideally in a way that allows for an ironic, critical distance from it, and
the development or inculcation of such attachment serves as preparation for the
development of respect for other state cultures (Turner 2002: 49).
Noting the difficulties inherent in obtaining compliance from individuals with
the duties embedded in any conception of global citizenship, Turner argues
for an emphasis not on a core of rights ostensibly evident across all cultures
(see Ignatieff 2001). Rather, he advocates an emphasis on the ‘unity of human
misery’, or a consensus that he sees having emerged around actions or events that
are considered insufferably wrong (Turner 2002: 55). Respect for other cultures
is noted as a key value, but Turner rejects strong cultural relativism, for example,
allusions to ‘Asian values’ as a means of critiquing claims for universal human
rights (46–7; see Sen 1997; Langlois 2001). Rather, individuals within specific
nation-states are to be educated in a way that promotes love of country, and at the
same time educated to adopt a ‘cool’ or thin identification that does not preclude
support for international citizenship or human rights doctrine.
Turner’s account is explicitly universalist in its promotion of a relatively
strong conception of human rights, yet it emphasises the importance of particular
communities in ways that recall more straightforwardly particularist accounts of
community and belonging. For example, Michael Walzer would cite principles
of state sovereignty, in particular non-intervention and the ability of a community
to admit or exclude outsiders as it chooses, as vital in sustaining ‘communities of
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character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some
special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life’
(Walzer 1983: 62; see also Walzer 1977: 90). However, for Walzer, the presumed
uniqueness of the way of life that has been developed within the nation-state
tends to preclude the development of relatively thick conceptions of universal
human rights.
In Turner’s approach, the presumed uniqueness of national communities is
not emphasised. Rather, the state context is a training ground for the kinds
of values that can encourage individuals to adopt a genuinely universalistic
stance toward human rights. If that is the case, however, it is not clear why the
state per se must be viewed as the appropriate inculcator of global citizenship
values, or in Turner’s term, cosmopolitan virtue. For example, states and state
sovereignty could be seen as merely a means to the end of protecting and
promoting the interests of individuals. Cosmopolitan theorists commonly note,
with commentators on human rights theory and practice, that principles of state
sovereignty, especially of non-intervention, often have facilitated the violation of
human rights within states (Pogge 2002: 139–44; see Donnelly 2002), though of
course that outcome is not categorical (Falk 2000: Ch. 4). However, in a universal
individualist frame such as cosmopolitanism, if some other global institutional
configuration were found to better achieve the promotion of core individual
rights, or to better promote just outcomes for individuals in general, then that
system would be viewed as preferable. The advocate of a more explicitly
universalist form of international citizenship will have difficulty demonstrating
why such institutional evolution should not be prescribed if it would better
promote human rights.
In fact, an approach to international citizenship that offers such an
instrumental view, in addition to presaging a remarkable range of insights
offered by current cosmopolitan and global citizenship theorists, originates
with MacCunn (1899). MacCunn, who is most often identified with the British
Idealists, in his more cosmopolitan vein cited the Westphalian system as a
frequent impediment to the realisation of cosmopolitan ideals, as well as their
best institutional hope. The core individual duty identified by MacCunn, and
one that receives current expression in the capabilities-based cosmopolitanism
of Nussbaum (2000b), is for individuals to help others realise ‘the capacity for
a good life’ (1899: 155). For MacCunn, helping others realise that capacity,
whether they are compatriots in a relatively wealthy state or living in a distant,
impoverished state, is our fundamental duty as human beings.
The ideal for MacCunn is a system structured so that one’s duties to act as
a global citizen are discharged in also acting as a good national citizen, i.e. by
helping compatriots to realise their capacity for a good life. Again the importance
of working through the existing institutional structure is considered instrumental.
That is, one could attempt to ‘walk the noble but less effectual path’ of the
missionary or others delivering direct aid to individuals overseas (MacCunn
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1899: 167), but the existing states system is likely the best available means of
fulfilling natural duties of mutual aid.
The state instrumentalism implicit in such an account bears important
similarities to many cosmopolitan-liberal arguments, where states are held to
have potentially strong instrumental value as institutions capable of securing
rights and organising the discharge of individual obligations, but they are not
seen as having intrinsic value or interests independent of the individuals within
them (Beitz 1999a). It represents a departure from a more straightforward inter-
national citizenship view, which would see state membership as intrinsically
significant. Such an approach can be seen as an important potential bridge
between international citizenship and more encompassing conceptions of
global citizenship, as well as between the global citizenship and cosmopolitan
literatures.
Global Citizenship as Moral Orientation
One more encompassing approach to global citizenship involves the promotion
of a global ethic or attitude toward the other across national boundaries.
Examining some particular arguments here may be useful for clarifying
individual duties, and especially for highlighting a key difference between the
individual global citizen and the kind of individual moral agent that may be
presumed within moral cosmopolitanism. That is, moral cosmopolitanism, while
it may consider the interests of all individuals, does not necessarily presume the
existence of some actual or potential global community of which each individual
is in some substantive way a member (Van den Anker 2002: 166). Central to the
concept of the global citizen is the understanding that one is part of a discrete
global community, with duties toward specific others in that community, rather
than a bearer of essentially abstract rights or duties to all others. As Dower and
Williams note, in essentially all accounts of fully global citizenship, ‘what is
being asserted is that humans are in some fundamental sense members of a wider
body as contrasted to the membership of a particular political community such as
the city-state, nation-state, or even an empire. All the latter are accidents of one’s
birth or circumstance. . . . There is something . . . that ties us together in terms of
identity, loyalty or commitment’ (Dower and Williams 2002: 2).
That is not to say that the global citizen must be construed as a member
of some solidarist Republican world state, with some form of global-national
consciousness being promoted by state institutions and absorbed by its members.
Rather, individuals, by imagining themselves in global community with all
others, may be more inclined to consider the interests of particular, concrete
individuals across borders, and may be more inclined to engage in open,
mutualistic dialogue with them. Likewise, a global citizenship approach
presumes that, even if some comprehensive set of moral principles could be
derived from the bare facts of what humans need and what they deserve, those
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principles likely could not be effectively enacted without the actual negotiation
of difference through dialogue that is inherent in the concept of community. An
emphasis on global citizenship helps to promote sensitivity to such variation and
can help to promote an attitude of respect in dialogue where traditions, or local
practices of power or domination, may seem to be at odds with cosmopolitan
principles (see Nussbaum 1999).
So, presuming some sort of membership in a global human community,
theorists of global citizenship as a moral attitude have been concerned foremost
with identifying the ethical orientation most appropriate to guiding individual
action in that community. Along with offering accounts that are clearly rooted in
the Kantian ethical commonwealth (see Carter 1997; Hutchings 1999), theorists
have examined ways in which some sort of global loyalty might be inculcated in
individuals to promote the observance of human rights (Roche 1997; Midgley
1999), how a global ethic could be formed and promoted around principles
shared by the world’s major religions (Küng 1997), or how a global civic culture
(Boulding 1988) might be developed.
Richard Falk offers an account that is less specific in its moral prescriptions
than some, but which may offer the best overall guidance for the kind of moral
attitude the global citizen could adopt. Falk has developed the ideal of the
global citizen as ‘citizen pilgrim’ (Falk 1995, 2002). The citizen pilgrim is one
who possesses ‘the spirit of a sojourner, committed to transformation that is
spiritual as well as material, that is premised on the wholeness and equality
of the human family’ (Falk 2002: 27). Citizen pilgrims are not interested in
‘technical fixes’ to improve the efficiencies of neoliberal economic integration,
while giving insufficient attention to what Falk sees as its many harmful effects
(2002: 27). Nor are they multinational elites who consider themselves at home
in an intercontinental world of posh hotels and restaurants while giving little
thought to the struggles faced by the less-affluent who constitute most of the
world’s population (Falk 2005).
Citizen pilgrims are expected to act in a way that is resonant in some
ways of Plato’s guardians. Bearing appropriate values and an orientation of
solidarity in global community toward others, they will address challenges
and opportunities as they emerge in an integrating global system, with an eye
to promoting sustainable development and humane governance (Falk 2002:
28). While Falk does not elaborate specific institutional changes that a citizen
pilgrim might be expected to undertake, his outline of the orientation that
should be adopted actually is quite demanding and can offer useful guidance
for accounts more directly concerned with necessary or appropriate trans-state
institutions. In particular, Falk’s account can provide a means of understanding
how current trans-state activists, such as those noted at the beginning of this
article, can be viewed as practicing a normatively and empirically meaningful




Global Citizenship and Global Institution Building
Theorists working within this approach do advocate the creation of suprastate
institutions capable of enabling a concrete practice of trans-state citizenship, and
there is a potentially significant link between institutional global citizenship and
the conception of natural duty outlined by Rawls. Recall that in Rawls’s scheme
of natural duties, all individuals, regardless of their institutional affiliations,
would have a duty to further just arrangements (Rawls 1999a: 98), or ‘to assist
in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least
when this can be done with little cost to ourselves’ (Rawls 1999: 294). Some
cosmopolitan theorists have extrapolated from this a straightforward individual
duty to promote the creation of global institutions capable of regulating trans-
state interactions, though not a comprehensive world state (see Tan 2004: 170).
Others have identified a closely related duty to promote the creation of global
institutions generally capable of securing just outcomes (Jones 1999: 69), and
possibly including a world state (Copp 2005).
I have argued elsewhere that, given biases against cosmopolitan distributive
justice inherent in a sovereign states system, the cosmopolitan theorist should
advocate comprehensive, democratically accountable integration between states,
from the regional to the fully global level (Cabrera 2004, 2005). In that
context, a conception of global citizenship could identify the very specific duties
incumbent on all to promote the creation of an actual global political community,
up to and including some comprehensive form of world state. It is not necessary,
however, to firmly press the institutional claim in order to identify the ways in
which a conception of global citizenship can help to clarify the parameters of
individual cosmopolitanism. I will offer here an approach to global citizenship
that is broad enough to be consistent with a range of particular conceptions,
and yet is specific enough to play the role identified for global citizenship as
individual cosmopolitanism. According to this conception, individuals act as
global citizens when they:
a) reach across international boundaries, or internal boundaries of differential
citizenship
b) in order to help secure those fundamental rights that would be better protected
if there were a just system of global institutions in place, and
c) work to help put such a system in place.
I will note first that implicit in criterion ‘a’ is that such cross-border
outreach is undertaken in a spirit of community with all others. Individuals
imagine themselves embedded in a global community, rather than as members
of discrete, ‘separate but equal’ moral communities, and they are concerned
to ensure the justice and sustainability of the global community. Thus, the
desert humanitarians noted at the beginning of this article cite their sense of
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belonging to a common humanity as reason enough to reach across barriers
of citizenship, nationality, and in the frame of some more critical observers,
criminality, to fulfill felt duties of mutual aid. The Minutemen, adopting more a
rigidly nationalistic approach to membership, express a much different sense of
duty to the non-citizen other, in particular those attempting to cross a national
boundary without authorisation.
Emphasised in criterion ‘b’ is the importance of envisioning a fully just
system of global institutions and the principles that would obtain within it. It
offers an approach to identifying a firm schedule of moral requirements, i.e. to
conceiving of ourselves as embedded in a framework of just institutions that
would enable us to move from somewhat weak and vaguely specified natural
duties of aid, to a clearly delimited set of obligations to be discharged in global
community: a ‘legal dimension’ of global citizenship. This approach can be
seen as positing a duty to act as though one had firm obligations of justice
within an actually existing scheme of institutions. As such, it would not draw a
sharp distinction between individual duties and obligations, as discussed below.
Finally, under criterion ‘c’, individuals are understood to have a duty to help
promote the kind of institutional transformation under which all in the global
human community would be offered due protection. It attempts to fill in the
contours of Kant’s imagined global community of co-legislators by positing
actual institutions within which members of a global community would engage
in dialogue, coordinate action and regulate shared practices.
To reinforce, the characterisation offered here would accommodate a range
of specific conceptions of global citizenship. It is consonant with, and could be
enriched by, many within the global ethic approach, including Falk’s account
of the citizen pilgrim. It could accommodate an instrumentalist international
citizenship such as MacCunn’s, given that it is possible to conceive and move
closer at least to some ideal form of Westphalian states system in which all
states would be equally empowered to protect the rights or vital interests of
their citizen charges. The approach also would accommodate many discrete
conceptions of institutional global citizenship. Those would include moderate
institutional accounts that would stop short of advocating some comprehensive
global government while still calling for extensive global integration (Van den
Anker 2002), or Kantian ‘constitutionalization’ (Habermas 2006: Ch. 8) to
secure more just outcomes for individuals within states.
I will close this section by focusing on a particular, discourse-based account
of institutional global citizenship offered by Andrew Linklater (1998, 1999a,
1999b). Emphasis will be given to its potential significance and some important
possible challenges to it. Both should provide further clarification on the
contours of a defensible global citizenship, as well as the fit of such a conception
within a broader concept of cosmopolitan right.
Linklater argues that Kant’s imaginary kingdom of co-legislators should be
transformed where feasible into actual transnational citizenries (1998: 205–6).
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Like the cosmopolitan democrats, he emphasises ways in which the processes
of economic integration may be reducing the ability of those within states to
exercise democratic control over a range of policy issues (1998: 191–2). He gives
attention to the harms that may be perpetrated by a state on others as further
reason to move toward suprastate institutions within which a more concrete
trans-state citizenship can be practiced, and in which individuals ‘can exercise
their moral right to refuse and renegotiate offers’ (Linklater 1999a: 51). He is,
however, explicit that the individual duty to create suprastate institutions arises
among members of like-minded societies, ‘in the sense of having broadly similar
conceptions of citizenship’ (1999a: 51).
Linklater’s approach is concerned not only with the kinds of institutions
which could embody a conception of trans-state or global citizenship, but
with the kinds of duties that may be incumbent on individuals to create
them. It thus offers a route to conceiving of and actually moving toward
the implementation of forms of trans-state citizenship, and its emphasis on
converting an imaginary commonwealth of co-legislators into an actual process
of dialogue and contestation among trans-state citizens is potentially quite
significant. There could be, however, significant theoretical friction between
the universals that underlie the conception of trans-state citizenship Linklater
advocates, and an implementation scheme that would place strong emphasis on
interdependence or like-mindedness.
Consider how the interdependence issue has been addressed in terms of
cosmopolitan distributive justice. In that frame, Beitz initially argued that it
was the fact of global economic interdependence that justified speaking in
terms of a global basic structure to which principles of distributive justice
should be applied, and within which there were recognisable obligations of
justice to extend distributions (Beitz 1999). Later, however, Beitz moved
away from a strong emphasis on the actual character of relations between
states in determining the distributions that individuals within and across states
owe to one another (Beitz 1983). Instead, he made reference to universal
human characteristics. Such a move helps in part to avoid circumstances under
which individuals could be construed as appropriately excluded from trans-
state distributions because of wholly contingent factors that caused them not
to be integrally embedded in the global economy, including their states’ level
of development or possession of valuable resources, or decisions made by
elites in hierarchical states (see Cabrera 2004: Ch. 3; Caney 2005b). Others,
including Barry (1995: 52–67) and Waldron (1993: 21), also have focused on
universal human characteristics, rather than interstate relations, in developing
and defending principles of cosmopolitan justice.
The guiding aim of the dialogic approach Linklater outlines is to enable
individuals, especially the vulnerable within states, to engage in dialogue as
equals in a global public sphere, and by so doing to highlight and oppose
injustices both within and above states. However, if global citizenship, or
96
Global Citizenship as the Completion of Cosmopolitanism
regional trans-state citizenship, is presumed to be appropriately differentiated
according to a state’s level of economic interdependence with others, or its
‘like-mindedness’ with nearby states, then the most vulnerable may still have
no voice. That is not, of course, to pose some universal imperative to intervene
in hierarchical states or otherwise pursue integration by force. Rather, it
is to say that a more straightforward emphasis on the universalist ethical
underpinnings of Linklater’s approach could better enable it to achieve its
goal of ultimately bringing all individuals into the global public sphere as
interlocutors.
Objections: Duty and Obligation
Interdependence and related questions, in fact, speak to the core defensibility
of the concept of global citizenship. Consider the challenge to the definitional
coherence of global citizenship offered by Hannah Arendt, among others. It
holds that one simply cannot be a global citizen in the absence of state-like
global institutions. Since there are no such bodies to define and enforce citizen
duties and rights, to specify participatory procedures, avenues of institutional
access and other parameters of concrete citizenship practice, there is no global
citizenship (Arendt 1968a: 81; see Walzer 1996). The claim also could be
understood more narrowly in terms of duty and obligation. That is, since concrete
obligations of justice arise only in the context of institutions, and there are no
fully cohesive global institutions, it may be incoherent to speak of firm global
citizen requirements in the current system. Thus, David Held speaks of the
institutions of cosmopolitan democracy as potentially a context within which
‘the elusive and puzzling meaning of global citizenship becomes a little clearer’
(Held 2004: 115).
First, I will note that Arendt’s claim must be formally true. Individuals do
not hold membership in cohesive global institutions and thus cannot be global
citizens. They can, however, act ‘as’ global citizens, and in a non-trivial sense. As
outlined above, they can be viewed as having a natural duty to act as though there
were a just global institutional frame in place, and to discharge their presumed
obligations toward others accordingly. I will suggest that such an approach is
defensible in large part because the line between duty and obligation is not
so bright as is sometimes claimed. To elaborate, I will consider distinctions
Thomas Pogge has drawn between the two, and some ways in which his firmly
obligations-based approach may rely implicitly on the moral force of natural
duties to aid.
Pogge has argued strenuously that the cosmopolitan should not place
strong emphasis on individual natural duties of mutual aid, in part because
it would be difficult to motivate individuals to act on such positive duties
to others, especially to noncompatriots. He views obligations not to harm
others as potentially much more capable of motivating action consistent with
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cosmopolitanism, including fulfilling cosmopolitan distributive demands (Pogge
2002: 132–6). For Pogge, those in affluent states are implicated in a range of
harms perpetrated through unjust global institutions, including the global trade
regime, intergovernmental organisations, norms regulating interstate borrowing
that allow corrupt leaders to enrich themselves, and a host of others. Thus ‘the
worse-off are not merely poor and often starving, but are being impoverished
and starved under our shared institutional arrangements, which inescapably
shape their lives’ (Pogge 2002: 201).
Pogge places greatest emphasis on the responsibility of decision-makers and
other influential elites within affluent states to initiate changes in the global order
(2002: 172–3). He maintains, however, that ordinary individuals in affluent states
also are responsible for institutional harms. An analogy is drawn between current
citizens of affluent states and those living in the slaveholding states of the past.
Even if citizens of those states did not hold slaves themselves, Pogge asserts, they
could be held responsible at some morally significant level for the institutional
scheme which they helped to uphold through their routine daily actions. Thus,
they had clear obligations of justice to promote the transformation of unjust
societal institutions (Pogge 1989: 178).
A harm interdependence approach is potentially extremely valuable as one
frame of obligation, not least for encouraging individuals to consider the
institutional effects their freely made choices could have. However, Pogge’s
scheme, besides being subject to some of the same critique noted above in
Beitz’s turn from interdependence, will face specific challenges in its emphasis
on collective responsibility. First, we can note that Pogge, like many who ground
cosmopolitan distributive obligations in interdependence or intense mutual
influence, appears to presume that there is a threshold of mutual influence among
states that, once reached, justifies the application of some distributive principle
that would apply to all equally. But it is not clear why, if states are to qualify for
some scheme of distribution based on their level of interaction or influence with
other states, some variable principle would not be more appropriately applied
(Caney 2005: 396–7; cf. Beitz 1999a: 165). David Hume, for example, argued
that, since human interaction or mutual influence was weaker at the interstate
level than within states, moral principles applied with less force above the state
(see Cohen 1984). Such a principle would at least have to be considered if
individuals were to be included or not in a global distributive scheme based on
some variable status such as their state’s level of interaction with other states,
rather than on their status as human beings.
Pogge would hold direct decision makers and influential elites, who have a
clearer chain of accountability, more responsible for harms imposed. All non-
elites, however, also would be held accountable at some equal baseline level.
All are exhorted to promote movement toward a more just institutional structure,
and institutional transformations of the kinds mandated would require significant
tax-financed revenues to execute. Regardless of their personal participation in the
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kinds of institutional regimes implicated, all would appear to be held to an equal
standard of responsibility and amount of rectification.
Further, and perhaps more significantly, in adopting an approach that would
hold all in a state responsible and obligated to rectify injustices, Pogge must
show how even very young children and others who cannot be said to have
participated in imposing harms are justifiably implicated. Related critiques have
been made of collective-responsibility arguments that would reject cosmopolitan
distributions on grounds that less-affluent states are rightly held responsible for
their own policy choices (Rawls 1999; Miller 2004). How, some critics have
asked, can ordinary individuals, much less children, be implicated in such policy
choices? (LaFollette 1996: 79; Dworkin 2000: 322). A harm-interdependence
approach may fare somewhat better in response to this critique, given that
children born into affluent states would be held responsible for actions by a state
that likely can offer them many benefits. Significant questions would remain,
however, about holding individuals directly responsible for events over which
they exercise no control, e.g. their luck of birth.
Finally, and most salient here, implicit positive duties to aid or further
just institutions actually may be doing much of the work that is claimed for
obligations not to harm in Pogge’s scheme. Pogge himself has acknowledged that
it may not be possible for individuals in affluent states to avoid contributing to the
harms he identifies. Even so, he states, those in affluent countries are obligated to
promote institutional transformation. ‘Those presently most disadvantaged have
virtually no means for initiating such reforms. We do. And our responsibility
vis-à-vis existing injustices hinges upon our ability to initiate and support
institutional reforms’ (Pogge 1989: 11–2). It is difficult to see, short of re-placing
themselves in a less-favored position within a less-affluent state, how individuals
can be held firmly responsible for harms they could not have conceivably avoided
causing. It is not the case, for example, that they could or should have been
more careful prior to some accident that injured others. Rather, all are somehow
equally implicated by their life placement in an affluent state. That being the
case, the force of the moral requirement to promote institutional reforms may
actually spring from implied positive duties to further just institutions. As in the
case above, individuals who are so placed as to be capable of rendering aid in
the form of institutional change are said to be required to do so, but the moral
requirement does not clearly spring from any harms they have caused.
The foregoing should be sufficient to show that the case for focusing almost
exclusively on individual obligations to avoid harming is not so clear cut.
Rhetorically, encouraging individuals to avoid harming others may carry more
general weight than exhorting them to act on positive duties per se. In practice,
however, it is not a straightforward matter to demonstrate how far or whether
any specific non-elite within an affluent state can be held responsible for
injustices produced by current global institutions. More centrally, the insight that
individual natural duties of mutual aid and furthering just institutions may be
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implied within a harm interdependence approach helps to strengthen the case for
treating duties and obligations as closely interconnected, or as both vital to the
overall cosmopolitan project (Caney 2007). As such, it reinforces the coherence
of a conception of global citizenship that, in the absence of cohesive global
institutions, would speak in terms of individual duties to act according to the
obligations, or ‘legal dimension’, of a fully global citizenship that would obtain
were a just system of global institutions in place.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that global citizenship, appropriately understood,
is an integral part of a comprehensive conception of cosmopolitan right. By
conceiving of global citizenship as filling the theoretical space of individual
cosmopolitanism, we can clarify both the parameters of a defensible conception
of global citizenship and the duties and obligations that are incumbent in a frame
which treats individuals, rather than states or other groupings, as the ultimate
units of moral concern.
According to the approach detailed here, individuals are acting as global
citizens when they reach out to others across international boundaries, or internal
boundaries of differential citizenship, in order to help secure those fundamental
rights that would obtain were there a just global system of institutions already
in place, and when they work to help put a system in place. Such an approach
is consonant with a broad range of specific conceptions of global citizenship,
including those that would argue for the creation of suprastate institutions within
which a more encompassing, actual global citizenship could be practiced. In
positing a natural duty to act as though there were a just system of global
institution already in place, the approach helps to highlight connections between
individual natural duties and obligations of justice. Thus, it can help to clarify
individual moral requirements that are unmediated by institutions, those that
arise in relation to the transformation of existing global institutions, and those
that may arise in relation to institutions that do not yet exist.
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